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INTRODUCTION

There are continual heated debates over whether or not churches
and houses of worship are shown bias in the zoning process. One side
of the argument focuses on the fact that cities intentionally create zoning ordinances to prevent new churches from being built and to discriminate against certain religions.1 It is easy to understand how
zoning ordinances and land use regulations are extremely important
1. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 755, 760 (1999); Michael Paisner, Note, Boerne Supremacy: Congres-
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to churches and religious institutions. A place of worship is essential
to organized religions. Not only does it provide a common place for
people to gather, but it also helps perpetuate the sense of unity among
members so as to strengthen the faith community. Without places of
worship, organized religions would become obsolete.
With that understood, it must be noted that the opponents argue
that churches have an advantage over other institutions because they
are shown deference with regards to zoning rights.2 Cities oppose
church zoning requests for a variety of reasons, such as creation of
more traffic hazards and noise in a residential area or reduction of tax
benefits in a commercial area. As a result, and in an effort to protect
churches and preserve the constitutional right of the free exercise of
religion, Texas legislators passed the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) in 1999. 3
The Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act states that the government cannot impose regulations that place a substantial burden on
a person's free exercise of religion.4 Texas courts generally agree that
"strict scrutiny" is the proper standard of review for discretionary land
use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise; however,
the Act does not define what qualifies as a "substantial burden."5 Unfortunately, battles between cities and churches over zoning ordinances are becoming more frequent, and therefore courts would
benefit from clearer guidelines. The Texas legislature should amend
the TRFRA to include a definition of "substantial burden" so as to
prevent further discrepancies between court decisions and to decrease
discrimination against churches.
This Article will begin with a background of the TRFRA by exploring the developments in federal law that led to its adoption. It will
then examine a proposed definition of "substantial burden" given by a
Texas court, followed by examples of similar definitions from courts
outside of Texas. This Article will then provide current examples of
how Texas courts could benefit greatly from a definition of "substantial burden."
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1990, the United States Supreme Court held that the government must show a compelling state interest for interfering with an
sional Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores and the Scope of Congress's Article I
Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 541 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalismand the Public Good: The True Story
Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311,
235-36 (2003).
3. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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individual's right to the free exercise of religion, which is evident in
two main cases.6
A.

Sherbert and Yoder

The compelling state interest test as applied to the free exercise of
religion was first introduced in Sherbert v. Verner. In South Carolina,
a Seventh-day Adventist was fired for refusing to work on a Saturday,
the observed Sabbath.7 When the plaintiff filed for unemployment,
South Carolina denied unemployment benefits on the grounds that
she failed to accept suitable work without good cause.8 The plaintiff
claimed that she was punished by South Carolina for observing one of
her important religious practices, and as a result she was denied her
right to freely exercise her religious beliefs.9 Upon review, the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the State's decision to deny the plaintiff unemployment benefits because it found that she was not prevented from "the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her
religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience." 1
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that withholding unemployment benefits because of her religious beliefs imposed a
burden which should be justified by a "compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.""1 South Carolina claimed that its "compelling state interest" was
to deter "the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants
feigning religious objections to Saturday work.""l In its holding, the
United States Supreme Court declared otherwise stating that faith
should not be a bar to receiving public welfare benefits:
South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest. This holding but reaffirms a
principle that we announced a decade and a half ago, namely that
no State may exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians,
or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or13lack of
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
The Supreme Court found South Carolina's argument for its "compelling state interest" unconvincing. Therefore, it reversed the South
6. See Sen. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 138, 76th Leg., R.S.
(Apr. 6, 1999).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
8. Id. at 399-401.
9. Id. at 401.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
12. Id. at 406-07.
13. Id. at 410.
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Carolina Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff her unemployment

benefits.1 4

Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that the
state had not met its burden to show a compelling state interest. 15 In
Yoder, three Amish parents were convicted for refusing to send their
children to a public school beyond the eighth grade.' 6 The parents
claimed that requiring their children to attend a public school beyond
the eighth grade was a substantial burden on their free exercise of
religion.' 7 According to the parents, their religion upheld the belief
that if the children were sent to public high school, they would be
exposed to the "danger of the censure of the church community" and
their salvation would be endangered.'" Although the Wisconsin trial
court agreed that its law requiring children to attend school until the
age of sixteen interfered with the Amish religion, the court found that
the law was a "reasonable and constitutional exercise of governmental
power."' 9 The Wisconsin Circuit Court upheld the convictions.20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Circuit
Court.2 ' The Supreme Court found that the parents had established
that this law imposed a substantial burden on their religion, which
then shifted the burden to the state to prove that it had a compelling
state interest that outweighed the parents' religious interests.22 The
state argued two reasons that its law furthered a compelling state interest: (1) the state has an interest in preparing self-reliant citizens for
participation in and contribution to society; and (2) parents should not
deny children their substantive right to an education.23
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found neither of these state interests
compelling enough to outweigh Amish interests.2 4 The United States
Supreme Court agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
The States have had a long history of amicable and effective relationships with church-sponsored schools, and there is no basis for
assuming that, in this related context, reasonable standards cannot
be established concerning the content of the continuing vocational
education of Amish children under parental guidance, provided always that state regulations are not inconsistent with what we have
said in this opinion. 5
14. Id.

15. See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

207-08.
208-09.
209.
213.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
See id. at 213-14.
Id. at 221.
See id. at 224-25.
Id. at 236.
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B.

The Shift from Compelling State Interest to Rational Basis

The standard set by Sherbert and Yoder was that when a state law
substantially burdened a person's free exercise of religious liberty, the
state was required to show that the law served a compelling state interest and that the law was narrowly tailored to meet its goals by the
least restrictive means.2 6 The initial burden was on the claimant to
show a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion, which then
shifted the burden to the state to show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.27
However, in 1990 the Sherbert and Yoder compelling state interest
test was replaced with a rational basis test.2 8 In Employment Division
v. Smith, two men were dismissed from their jobs for ingesting peyote
as part of a Native American religious ritual.29 The Employment Division of Oregon denied unemployment benefits because they were
fired for violating state drug laws, despite the claim that the men were
practicing their religion. 0
The United States Supreme Court upheld Oregon's decision, holding that generally applicable criminal laws should not be subject to a
compelling interest standard.3 1 The Court rationalized that the compelling interest test led to governmental assessment of every individual case to determine the reasons for the prohibited conduct:
[The test] would create an extraordinary right to ignore generally
applicable laws that are not supported by "compelling governmental interest" on the basis of religious belief. Nor could such a right
be limited to situations in which the conduct prohibited is "central"
to the individual's religion, since that would enmesh judges in an
3 2 into the centrality of particular beliefs or
impermissible faith.
inquiry
a
practices to
Because this drug law was generally applicable, the Court replaced
33
the compelling interest test with the rational basis test.
This shift from a compelling interest test to a rational basis test affected zoning cases which can be generally applicable in nature. 34 As
26. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
894-95 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 888 (justifying a more lenient standard in that "we cannot afford the
luxury of deeming presumptively invalid ...every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order").
29. Id. at 874.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 873.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Daniel N. Price, Note, The Constitutional Standard for Zoning Cases
Under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 365,
369 (2002).
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long as a zoning ordinance applied to everyone in general, not just
churches, the government essentially had complete control over regulating zoning without having to consider religious beliefs and practices.3 5 The only requirement was that the law had to be "facially
neutral. '3 6 The rational basis test from Smith "gave governments the
unfettered discretion to make unilateral decisions on zoning issues as
long as the decision is applicable to everyone in general."3 7
C. A Failed Attempt to Return to the Compelling State Interest Test
In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.38 The RFRA served to protect the free
exercise of religion by requiring the government to have a "compelling interest" before it could burden or restrict the free exercise of
religion.3 9 The RFRA essentially restored the Sherbert and Yoder
compelling interest test.
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court had a chance to
review the RFRA. The RFRA was deemed unconstitutional because
it exceeded Congress's power under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Enforcement Clause grants Congress
the power to pass legislation that is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment."1 Essentially, the Enforcement Clause
protects the constitutional right to free exercise of religion."2
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the city council of Boerne, Texas, passed
an ordinance for a historic preservation plan."3 This ordinance conflicted with the expansion plans of Saint Peter Catholic Church, which
the Church had previously submitted for approval." As a result, the
church's building permit was denied and the Archbishop of San
Antonio brought suit claiming that the ordinance was invalid under
the RFRA. 45
In analyzing the constitutionality of the RFRA, the United States
Supreme Court found that Congress's powers, as set out in the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, were strictly "remedial.""46 Any remedy that Congress creates must have both
"congruence and proportionality" to the injury to be remedied. 7 In
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
39. Id.
40. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.
41. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 519-20.
47. Id. at 520.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss3/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I3.5

6

Laneri: The Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Does It Really Work?

2010]TEXAS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 463
passing the RFRA, Congress intended the provisions of the RFRA to
apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.4 8 The Supreme Court held that:
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a
substantive change in constitutional protections .... Simply put,
RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to
be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion.4 9
In Flores, the Supreme Court held that the RFRA went beyond
Congress's power and therefore declared the RFRA
unconstitutional.5 o
D.

The Introduction of the TRFRA

In response to the invalidation of the federal RFRA, many states
began passing their own version of the Act.51 This was done at the
urging of civil rights and religious groups who wanted to restore the
protections of the compelling interest test from Sherbert and Yoder
that had been taken away by Smith.5 2
In 1999, the Texas legislature passed the Texas Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (TRFRA), which "prohibits a government agency
from substantially burdening a person's free exercise of religion"5 3 unless the agency can prove that the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest."5 4 The TRFRA effectively mirrors the federal
RFRA that was struck down by the Supreme Court. The TRFRA
uses almost identical language as the federal RFRA, including phrases
such as "substantial burden," "compelling governmental
interest," and
'55
"least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
The purpose behind the TRFRA was to "restore religious freedom
to the status that it had for 30 years before the Smith decision in
1990. " 56 The supporters of the TRFRA believed that the compelling
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
49. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532, 534-35.
50. Id. at 536.
51. See John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets Among the Rubble, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 349 n.459 (1999) (recognizing
that Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Michigan, California, Ohio, Texas, Maryland, and Virginia had all either passed or were planning on passing a state version of
RFRA within one year after City of Boerne v. Flores).
52. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at *2, Barr v. City of Sinton, 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
871, 2009 WL 1712798 (Tex. June 19, 2009) (No. 06-0074).
53. Sen. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 138, 76th Leg. R.S. (July

9, 1999).
54. TEX. Civ. PRAc. &

REM. CODE ANN.

§ 110.003 (Vernon 2005).

55. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
56. House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 138, 76th Leg., R.S.
(May 17, 1999).
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state interest standard was an appropriate means of judging the state's
burden on free exercise of religion, which mirrors the beliefs behind
the federal RFRA.5 7 Although opponents of the TRFRA thought
that reinstating a compelling interest standard would make it harder
to create and enforce generally applicable laws,5" the TRFRA was
passed with more supporters than opponents.5 9
To reassure wary opponents who believed that the TRFRA would
"subject zoning decisions to automatic invalidation, rather than compelling interest review,"6 ° § 110.010 was added to the TRFRA. This
addition states that zoning laws would require the "same compelling
interest standards" that were present in both Sherbert and Yoder, as
opposed to automatic invalidation. 6 Section 110.010 states that "a
municipality has no less authority to adopt or apply laws and regulations concerning zoning, land use planning, traffic management, urban
nuisance, or historic preservation than the authority of the municipality that existed under the law as interpreted by the federal courts
before April 17, 1990."62 When the TRFRA was adopted, supporters
clarified that it "was enacted to provide greater protection for religious practices than the federal constitution as currently interpreted."6 3
After Texas and other states passed their own versions of the
RFRA, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000.64 Pursuant to RLUIPA, a government entity cannot substantially burden religious exercise unless there
is a compelling interest behind the burden, and the law is the "least
restrictive means" of furthering that interest.6 5 This was Congress's
attempt to limit Flores6 6 by mandating the return of the compelling
interest test.6 7 Like the TRFRA, the RLUIPA mirrored the language
of the original federal RFRA that was struck down.6 8

III.

PROPOSED DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN"

When a claim is brought under TRFRA, the initial burden is on the

plaintiff to show that the government is substantially burdening his or
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 52, at *5.
61. Id. at *5-6.
62. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.010 (Vernon 2005).
63. Voice of Cornerstone Church Corp. v. Pizza Prop. Partners, 160 S.W.3d 657,
672 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
65. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)-(2).
66. City of Boerne v.Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
67. § 2000cc (a)(1)(A).
68. Id.; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (Vernon 2005); 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb (2006), invalidated by Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
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her free exercise of religion.69 Essentially, a court will break its analysis down into two questions: (1) Is the burdened activity "religious
exercise," and if so, (2) is the burden "substantial"? 70
The TRFRA defines "free exercise of religion" as "an act or refusal
to act that is substantially motivated by sincere religious belief."7 1 Although "free exercise of religion" is explicitly defined in the TRFRA,
"substantial burden" is not.
A.

Guidance from the Fifth Circuit

In Hicks v. Garner,the Fifth Circuit examined the "substantial burden" standard.72 When the federal RFRA was still valid, Cleveland
Hicks brought suit against Texas prison officials. 73 As a member of
the Rastafari religion that prohibits cutting one's hair, Hicks claimed
that "the prison's grooming regulations interfered with the free exercise of 74
his religion, in violation of the First Amendment and
RFRA."
After the district court dismissed Hicks's claim, the Fifth Circuit
found that Hicks did have a valid claim under RFRA.7 5 The Fifth
Circuit explained that Hicks's claim should be analyzed using the
"substantial burden" test as opposed to the "reasonable opportunity"
test that was used before the RFRA. 76 Although the court did not
explicitly define "substantial burden," it did give some guidance to the
district court as to how it should define "substantial burden. '77 This
Fifth Circuit definition subsequently reappeared nine years later in a
zoning dispute between a city and a church.
B.

Interpreting a Texas Definition of "SubstantialBurden"

In Castle Hills FirstBaptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, the City of
Castle Hills denied the Baptist Church a permit to construct an additional parking lot and also refused to allow the Church to apply to
change the use of the top floor of the Church's building.78 The
Church claimed that the City's actions violated the Church's rights
under the RLUIPA, the United States Constitution, the TRFRA, and
the Texas Constitution.7 9
69. See, e.g., Balawajder v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice Institutional Div., 217
S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
70. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).
71. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001(a)(1).
72. Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 26 (5th Cir. 1995).
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 25.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at n.22.
78. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149RF, 2004 WL 546792, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
79. Id.
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In analyzing whether the City's denial of the Church's permits violated the RLUIPA and the United States Constitution, the court began by analyzing whether the City's denial imposed a "substantial
burden" on religious exercise.8" The court recognized that although
the RLUIPA does not give a statutory definition of "substantial burden," Congress intended for the term to be defined by both prior case
law and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 8 ' The court then looked to
Hicks v. Garnerfor guidance and found four standards for "substantial burden" that are applicable in the zoning context:
First, a burden is substantial when the believers demonstrate that
the government's conduct prevents them "from engaging in conduct
or having a religious experience which the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be
substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central
to religious doctrine. "82
Second, a burden exceeds the substantiality threshold when the government either compels conduct in contravention of the adherent's
beliefs or requires the adherent to refrain from conduct that is required by religious beliefs.83
Third, government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain
conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's] individual beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a [person's] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person]
reasonable opportunities to engage 8 in
those activities that are fun4
damental to the [person's] religion.
Finally, the burden is substantial "where the state conditions receipt
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure8 5on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.,
C. Definitions Provided by Courts Outside Texas
Other courts have found similar definitions for "substantial burden"
when analyzing a claim under the RLUIPA.
1. Seventh Circuit Definition
In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided its own definition of "substantial burden."8 6 Here, a Chicago ordinance required churches to
80. Id. at *7.
81. Id.

82. Id. at *8.
83. Id.

84. Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 26 n.22 (5th Cir. 1995).
85. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 545792, at *8.
86. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir.
2003).
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obtain a special use permit to operate in commercial and business areas, essentially restricting churches to manufacturing areas. 8 7 After
being denied special use permits, several churches came together to
bring suit against the City, alleging that the City's zoning plan was in
violation of the RLUIPA.8 8
The Seventh Circuit defined a "substantial burden" as "one that
necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for
rendering religious exercise-including the use of real property for
the purpose thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally-effectively impracticable." 8 9 Although the court found that the scarcity of
affordable land did pose a problem to churches, it was not enough to
qualify as a "substantial burden."9 The zoning plan might have contributed to the normal problems that business and property owners
face when finding a location in a big city, but it did not discourage
churches from locating in Chicago.91
2.

Eleventh Circuit Definition

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals presented yet another definition of "substantial burden" in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside.9 2 In Florida, two synagogues claimed that a city zoning ordinance violated the RLUIPA because it excluded churches and synagogues from business districts where private clubs and lodges were
permitted.9 3 The City claimed that it imposed the ordinance because
it needed that specific area for tax revenue.94 The City argued that it
could not afford to allow non-economic establishments in that area
because they would threaten the City's economic stability and possibly
impose economic hardship on the City's citizens.95 The district court
originally found for the City and granted an injunction.9 6
When the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision, it
declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit's definition of "substantial burden."'9 7 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a new definition of
"substantial burden" as one that results "from pressure that tends to
force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that
mandates religious conduct." 9 8 The synagogues argued that the zon87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
2004).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id.
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1218.
at 1221-22.
at 1222.
at 1227.
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ing imposed a "substantial burden" because it would require attendants to walk further to attend services at the permitted location,
therefore restricting who could attend the services and ultimately limiting membership. 99 The court reasoned that walking a few extra
blocks to the synagogues was not substantial enough that it would restrict "adherents to forego religious precepts."100
3. Ninth Circuit Definition
Although the case was unrelated to the zoning process, in Bryant v.
Gomez the Ninth Circuit provided its own definition of "substantial
burden."' ' When the federal RFRA was still valid, a prisoner
claimed that he was denied full religious Pentecostal services in accordance with his religion, and therefore the prison violated the
RFRA.' °2 The court defined "substantial burden" as when a person is
prevented from "engaging in conduct or having a religious experience
that is central to the religious doctrine."10 3 The prisoner argued that
he was denied his right to free exercise of religion because1 04he was
prevented from engaging in his specific Pentecostal services.
The court found that the prisoner established that these services
were unique to the Pentecostal faith, but also found that he did not
establish that they were mandated by his faith and "central to the religious doctrine."'0 5 The court also found that the prisoner gave no
reason for the court to believe that he could not meet the mandates of
his faith through
other options in the prison, such as non-denomina1 6
tional services.

0

4. United States Supreme Court Definition
The United States Supreme Court has even varied in its definition
of "substantial burden" over the years. Originally, the Court defined
"substantial burden" as when an individual was required to "choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion
...on

the other."'0 7 Later, the Court defined a "substantial burden"

as when the government coerces an individual's religious beliefs, as
opposed to simply interfering with them. 0 8 Finally, the definition
then shifted to find that a "substantial burden" was present when the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1228.
Id.
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 948.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986).
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government put "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs." 10 9
Although the case of Castle Hills applied to the federal RFRA,
courts have found that the guidelines provided by the Fifth Circuit can
apply to the TRFRA because the Texas legislature intended to mirror
the federal RFRA in the TRFRA. 11 However, because the federal
RFRA is no longer valid, Texas courts have accordingly relied upon
RLUIPA to ascertain the meaning of TRFRA."' Congress's intent in
enacting RLUIPA was to mirror the federal RFRA. 11z Under
RLUIPA, and therefore under TRFRA, the initial burden is on the
plaintiff to show that "the government is substantially burdening his
free exercise of religion.""' 3
Because the first step in a claim under TRFRA is to prove a "substantial burden," parties would greatly benefit from having a statutory
definition. Although there are many definitions of "substantial burden" available, the most comprehensive and accurate definition comes
from Hicks. A more specific definition of "substantial burden" would
provide many benefits, including enhancing better communication
and understanding between cities and churches, as well as providing a
guide to resolve current and future disputes.
IV.

CURRENT CASES WHERE A DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL
BURDEN" WOULD BE BENEFICIAL

Although the current TRFRA is helpful in reducing discrimination
against churches through city zoning ordinances, discrimination is still
present. A city might deny a church's zoning request, the church may
subsequently bring suit against the city, and the zoning request will
then be granted by the court. If a definition of "substantial burden" is
added to the TRFRA, cities will have a better understanding of what
they are and are not allowed to restrict in relation to a church's zoning. Ideally, then there will be fewer denials of church zoning requests
and therefore fewer lawsuits bogging down the courts. Currently,
there are many disputes between cities and churches over zoning regulations that have not been brought to court yet and which would
greatly benefit from a definition of "substantial burden."
109. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141

(1987).
110. See Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA1149-RF, 2004 WL 546792, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004) (finding that even though
this court's analysis was based on the federal RFRA, it also applies to evaluating a
substantial burden under RLUIPA).
111. See, e.g., Balawajder v. Tex. Dep't. of Criminal Justice Institutional Div., 217
S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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A Resolution to Castle Hills

As discussed above, a dispute over zoning and land use began in the
1990s between the city of Castle Hills, Texas, and Castle Hills First
Baptist Church."' In 2001, this dispute entered the courts as the City
continually denied the Church's requests to expand its church building
and parking lot." 5 The Church pointed out the City's continual "campaign against places of worship" by trying to either force out or discourage religious facilities from locating in the City." 6 The City had
previously forced two separate churches out of the City by refusing to
allow them to expand and placing unreasonable expectations upon
them. 1 7 In return, the City analogized the Church to cancer, claiming
that it "feed[s] on homes 8in much the same way as a cancerous tumor
feeds on healthy cells.9M
On June 11, 2008, a federal district judge in San Antonio issued a
consent decree after seven years of litigation between the Church and
the City." 9 The decree allows the Church to add on to its building
and expand its parking facilities, as the Church had been requesting
for years. 20
In regard to the Church's request to change the use of its fourth
floor, the analysis did not begin with the City's denial of the Church's
request, but rather with the City's refusal to even consider the
Church's request.12 1 The City's denial was considered a "substantial
burden" under the first Hicks standard because the City completely
prevented the Church from seeking a permit needed for religious use
of existing property and facility.' 22 Essentially, the City came "too
close to requiring the Church to refrain from conduct required by religious beliefs.' 23 Although the court originally found that the City's
denial of the Church's parking request was not a "substantial burden"
because the parking was to allow for future expansion rather than cur114. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *4.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Petition at 2, Castle Hills, 2004 WL
546792 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (No. SA-01-CA-1149-RF), available at http://www.becketfund.org/files/f37e3.pdf.
117. THE BECKET FUND, CASTLE HILLS FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH V. THE CITY OF
CASTLE HILLS, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/42.html?PHPSESSID=67
da47cc5c0b2aee73d8226816bdc468 (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
118. Id.
119. Seven-Year Land Use Struggle Ends in Victory for Texas Church, INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM NEWSL. (The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Wash. D.C.), June
11, 2008, available at http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/784.html [hereinafter Seven-Year].
120. Id.
121. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *8.
122. Id. at *9.
123. Id.
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rent parking,12 4 the judge recently found that the Church should
also
1 25
be allowed to expand its parking to allow for future growth.
In this case, both the City and the Church could have benefitted
from an exact definition of "substantial burden." If the TRFRA contained such a definition, the City would have known that it needed to
at least consider the Church's request so as to make sure that the City
was not preventing the Church "from engaging in conduct or having a
religious experience which the faith mandates. '12 6 The City did not
know how the Church intended to use the extra floor, so the City
should not have simply refused to hear the Church's request. A TRFRA with a definition of "substantial burden" could have either prevented or at least shortened the seven years of litigation that tied up
both the City and the Church.
B.

The Issue of Imposing Maximum Standardsfor Churches

Stafford, Texas (a Houston suburb), was concerned about its future
revenue.1 27 At the time of this issue, Stafford had 51 religious institutions in a seven-square-mile area.12 8 In an effort to create revenuegenerating economic development, the City wanted to impose maximum building code standards that "assembly facilities" would be required to meet.1 29 These standards would basically restrict some of
the specific uses allowed in a church, extend the building code requirements, and enhance parking requirements.1 30 The City's intention behind these maximum standards was essentially to reduce the
number of churches and allow more businesses to generate revenue
for the City.
In order to have a better idea of what standards would be allowed
and what standards would impose a "substantial burden" on churches,
the City would greatly benefit from a TRFRA definition of "substantial burden." The City could regulate specific church uses, but not if it
requires the people of the church to "refrain from conduct that is
required by religious beliefs"' 3 1 or extend the building code
requirements.
The City could also enhance parking lot requirements, but only if it
subsequently does not prevent the people of the church "from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith man124. Id. at *11.
125. Seven-Year, supra note 119.
126. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *8.
127. Seshadri Kumar, Stafford Considers Maximum Rules for Assembly Facilities:
City Says it has 51 Religious Institutions, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 18, 2007, at 4, available at 2007 WLNR 1119721.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *8.
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dates." '3 2 Although this would require more work on the part of the
City to understand what the faith of a specific church requires, and it
would require more work on the part of the Church to demonstrate its
faith to the City, it would help prevent long-term disputes and costly
proceedings between the parties.
C. The Issue of Expanding Church Parking

In Bellaire, Texas (a Houston suburb), the Southwest Presbyterian
Church proposed a plan to the Bellaire City Council that would allow
the Church to build a new parking lot to accommodate an increase in
membership.' 33 Homeowners around the Church opposed a parking
lot because of the potential for increased noise and light pollution,
raised risk of flooding, and decreased property values. 134 Unfortunately for the neighboring residents, they do not have much of a say in
whether or not a parking lot can be built.
According to caselaw, although the City can work with the Church
to make sure the parking lot would not increase pollution and create a
higher risk of flooding, the City cannot simply prevent the Church
from expanding its parking. If the TRFRA provided a definition of
"substantial burden," the City would easily know that restricting parking needed due to an increase in membership would prevent churchgoers from "engaging in conduct
or having a religious experience
' 35
which the faith mandates.'
Fortunately, the City decided to approve the Church's proposal and
work with the Church to accommodate the homeowners' desires as
well. 136 A TRFRA definition of "substantial burden" might help
neighboring residents understand why the City must allow the Church
to create additional parking. It would also help residents appreciate
the limits that can and cannot be imposed on the Church.
D.

The Issue of Restricting Church Lot Sizes

In 1971, the city of Plano, Texas (a Dallas suburb), imposed an ordinance that required all churches to occupy lots of at least two acres.
In 2008, the Plano Vietnamese Baptist Church purchased a 1.2-acre
lot with the intention of occupying the building. 137 The Plano City
Council subsequently denied the Church a zoning variance that would
132. Id.
133. Anne Marie Kilday, Homeowners Against Plan by Area Church: Parking Lot
Addition Raises Concerns About Pollution, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 9, 2004, at 1,
available at 2004 WLNR 20939394.
134. Id.
135. Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *8.
136. City of Bellaire, Minutes of the Planning and Zoning Commission Regular
Meeting (Oct. 12, 2004) (on file with author).
137. Ed Housewright, Church's Battle Stirred Piano, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 28, 2008, at 1B,available at 2008 WLNR 18441933.
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allow the Church to occupy the building because the size of the lot
violated the City ordinance. 1 38 A Collin County district judge overruled the City's decision and granted the Church use of the building. 139 In response to this decision, a Piano City Council member
stated that the City should freely allow people to worship and argued
that the City should "let them use this space."' 4 °
Plano's zoning ordinance clearly imposes a "substantial burden" not
just on this Church but on all churches. 14 1 By requiring church lots to
be at least two acres, the City is restricting smaller churches, such as a
new church with few members and little money. In order for a small,
new church to raise money to occupy a lot larger than two acres, the
church must begin on a smaller lot to recruit members. The Piano
City ordinance would force small, new congregations to travel to another city to open. Moreover, if all of the cities surrounding Plano
imposed the same zoning requirement, where would the members of
these smaller, new churches be able to congregate?
If a church were to challenge Plano's ordinance under the TRFRA,
the City would have to show that the ordinance "is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest[ ] and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest."1 2 However, before the City has the burden to prove its "compelling interest," the burden would be on the
Church to show that the ordinance imposes a "substantial burden" on
it. With a specific definition of "substantial burden" in the TRFRA, a
church could easily prove that an ordinance restricting lot size would
prevent the church members from engaging in their religious experience of having a place of worship and building a community. This
"interference" would be much more than an "inconvenience" because
it would be preventing them from gathering to worship at all, and
therefore the City would ideally be more lenient in allowing special
43
permits for churches or change the zoning ordinance in its entirety.'
E.

The Issue of Threatening Legal Action

In Duncanville, Texas, the City Council denied Templo Bautista
14
Nueva Jerusalen's request to operate a church at a specific location.1
The denial came after opposition from surrounding property owners
who wanted to keep the location as commercial property for tax rea138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (Vernon 2005).
143. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149RE, 2004 WL 546792, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
144. Elizabeth Langton, Council: Church Can Open Duncanville Zoning Decision
Reversed After Threat of Legal Action, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 20, 2008, at 2B,
available at 2008 WLNR 3331173.
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sons and because of parking concerns.' 4 5 After the Liberty Legal Institute in Piano threatened to sue the City if it did not allow the
Church to operate, the City Council changed its mind and granted the
Church's zoning request. 4 6
Although the City allowed the Church to operate in its chosen location, it should not have taken a threat of legal action from the Liberty
Legal Institute to persuade the City to accommodate the Church's request. Cities have an obligation to work with churches to reach a satisfactory compromise over zoning issues. If Duncanville was
concerned about parking problems with the Church's new location,
then Duncanville should have tried to solve the problem with the
Church.
By simply denying the Church's request the first time, the City created a substantial "inconvenience" that prevented Church members
from engaging in their religious activities. 1 47 With a definition of
"substantial burden" in the TRFRA, the City would have originally
known that it had an obligation to do more than simply deny the
Church's request, and the Liberty Legal Institute would not have had
to get involved.
V.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TEXAS

In 2003, the City of Leon Valley, Texas (a suburb of San Antonio),
zoned religious facilities as Business 2, which also allowed for retail
businesses in the same zoning area. 1 48 In 2007, the City amended the
zoning rules to zone religious facilities as Business 3, which also allowed for storage units and warehouses.' 4 9
In the middle of the City's business district sits a vacant church
building that once belonged to the Church on the Rock. 150 When the
zoning was changed in 2003, the Church on the Rock and other previous owners were able to obtain special use permits from the City to
operate.15 ' When the most recent change occurred in 2007, the
Church on the Rock's permit allowed it to continue to occupy the
building until the permit expired. 152 After the permit's expiration, the
Elijah Group purchased the land and building in the hopes of con1 53
ducting church services.
The City rejected the Church's request to have the area re-zoned
back to Business 2, which would allow the Church to obtain a special
145.
146.
147.
148.
NEWS,

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792, at *8.
Valentino Lucio, Owners Sue to Enable Church Use, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSJan. 7, 2009, at 6B, available at 2009 WLNR 318682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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use permit to operate. 5 4 The City claims that its concerns are with
property taxes.' 5 5 The City needs the revenue from taxes on businesses, which it would not receive if the Church were located on that
property. 1 56 The Church felt that the City has continually tried to
push churches further and further outside the city, and the Church
had enough.1 5 7 The Church filed suit in October 2008.158
Because of the current economic state, cities are hurting for revenue; however, restricting churches is not the proper avenue to obtain
this revenue. Now is the time to remind cities that they "cannot exclude a church from an area for economic issues or tax issues or retail
issues."' 5 9 Cities need to look at the bigger picture of what effects
their actions have, and they need to realize that they are preventing
their citizens from "engaging in conduct or having religious experience which the faith mandates.' 60 They are requiring their citizens
to
"refrain from conduct that is required from religious beliefs.' 6'
Essentially, cities are denying their citizens their constitutional right
to free exercise of religion. If a definition of "substantial burden" is
added to the TRFRA, the continual discrimination that churches face
from cities would hopefully diminish because cities would have a better understanding of how their actions are preventing their citizens
from engaging in their religious activities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The TRFRA was a huge development for church rights in the zoning process; however, the process is still not complete. With a definition of "substantial burden" in the TRERA, there will be less grey
area in what cities and churches can and cannot do in regards to zoning. A clear definition would permit a church to build on an area that
is zoned for that purpose, while working with its neighbors to compromise on traffic and parking regulations. It would remind the opposing
neighbors that they cannot deny a person's right to participate in an
organized religion simply because they do not want a church in the
neighborhood. A clear definition would remind cities that they cannot just deny a church's request for a special permit without a compelling interest because by denying that request, the city is denying
people their right to free exercise of religion.
The court in Castle Hills said it best when it encouraged:
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149RF, 2004 WL 546792, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
161. Id.
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Castle Hills and all other similarly situated communities to engage
in thorough and positive debate and negotiation on the issues of
zoning of religious organizations and places of worship, recognizing
that in the arena of religion, all parties need trod lightly, out of respect for the beliefs of the adherents and out of respect for the importance of religion to our larger American culture. Cities must
govern the health, safety and welfare of their communities, but in so
doing, should consider carefully the positive 62and supportive role
that a place of worship will play in doing so.'
A TRFRA definition of "substantial burden" would reduce discrimination against churches, give cities better guidance in their zoning decisions, and hopefully perpetuate more straightforward and painless
resolutions between churches and cities over zoning disputes.
162. Id. at *20.
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